

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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CUBA

Authority to

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OADR

Confirming Washington Agreement (November 3), following is present policy on action in the Security Council and in the OAS:

1. Security Council

a. We do not want to have a Security Council Meeting this next week, before there is an indication that the Cubans are prepared to work with some form of UN presence.

b. We will need a Security Council Meeting at the end of Phase Two, to confirm all of the military undertakings and receive and accept the report of the Secretary General that he has verified the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

c. There is a question whether we need a Security Council Meeting at any time before the end of Phase Two. If the Cubans are prepared to cooperate with a UN presence and the Soviets agree, there would be some advantage in strengthening the Secretary General's hand by getting him an explicit Security Council mandate for the establishment of a UN presence which for the verification operation. But if the Cubans

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S/S - Mr. Weiner

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have not yet agreed to an acceptable form of UN presence, it would be a mistake to have a Security Council Meeting. The Cubans (and perhaps the Soviets) would use it to inject such issues as premature insistence on non-invasion guarantees, Guantanamo, violation of Cuban air space and the rest of Castro's five points.

d. We note that Secretary General has assumed a Security Council Meeting would be required to enable him to spend UN funds on this peace-and-security operation. US view is that he has ample authority under General Assembly Resolution 1735 (XVI) of December 20, 1961 to make "such commitments, not exceeding a total of US \$2 million, as the Secretary General certifies relate to the maintenance of peace and security". We recognize that his desire to go to Security Council is more a matter of political self-protection than of law, but in our view danger of a premature Security Council triggering a new round of acrimonious debate and thus interfering with the conclusion of reasonable arrangements to implement Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges far outweigh advantages to Secretary General of having more explicit mandate at this stage.

2. OAS

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a. For the present at least, we do not consider it advisable any new OAS action on aerial surveillance of Cuba. The surveillance we are now conducting is action taken under the OAS Resolution of October 23. We do not want to call into question the legitimacy of these current actions by asking for more explicit authority to do under OAS auspices what we are already doing under OAS auspices.

b. It would be useful, prior to the Security Council Meeting at which we exchange assurances and commitments, to have an OAS resolution which binds the whole hemisphere to non-invasion guarantee but explicitly states the condition (international arrangements to prevent reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and to prevent use of Cuba as Soviet military base) under which the non-invasion guarantee will remain valid. But this will probably not be needed for a couple of weeks or more; the timing of this OAS action should be shortly before the eventual Security Council Meeting which will signal the end of Phase Two.

End

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